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Public procurement in Kenya is an area that is fast evolving. The coming into force of 
Kenya’s new constitution in 2010 set the stage for reforms in the procurement sector.  
This thesis examines the eligibility and registration requirements under Kenya’s 
preference and reservation program; it interrogates the eligibility and registration 
processes’ appropriateness and the impact that these processes bear on the realization 
of the overall objectives of the public procurement (preference and reservation) 
program.  
The thesis evaluates the legal and regulatory framework upon which Kenya’s public 
procurement is anchored. It analyses the constitution and various legal instruments in 
a bid to understand how, and to what extent, they seek to improve access to public 
procurement opportunities by women, persons with disability and the youth.  
The research also considers the preferential procurement systems of the United States 
of America and that of South Africa. It contrasts the eligibility criteria and the 
registration requirements under the preference programs in the selected jurisdictions 
with the those obtaining in Kenya’s AGPO program.  
The thesis further discusses the various complexities in the AGPO eligibility and 
registration processes that have emerged in the course of conducting this research and 
explores possible solutions to the identified difficulties.     
Finally, the thesis offers a summary of the findings of the research and makes possible 
recommendations and suggestions for improvement. 
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1 CHAPTER ONE: RESEARCH BACKGROUND. 
1.1 Background of the Problem  
Public procurement in Kenya is an area that is fast evolving. A look back in history 
will quickly reveal and give testament to this assertion. From a largely unregulated 
system in the 1960s, the recent decades have seen the public procurement regulatory 
regime transform immensely. In the 1970s, 80s, and 90s, procurement by the 
Government and other public entities was regulated by treasury circulars. This 
ushered in a system of statutory regulation marked by the coming into force of the 
Public Procurement Disposal Act in 2005. Thereafter, in 2006, Procurement 
Regulations were published. These were made by the Minister in exercise of the 
mandate conferred by the Act. A monumental event along this reform journey was 
the promulgation of the Constitution of Kenya 2010.1  It delineated new parameters 
and defined new boundaries that would henceforth guide all procurement processes. 
By way of illustration, the principles of fairness, equitability, transparency, 
competitiveness and cost effectiveness2 were installed as the model pillars of public 
procurement, by virtue of Article 227. In addition, and of significant relevance in this 
study, is the requirement under Article 227, enjoining National Assembly to enact 
procurement legislation that would make provision for an affirmative action policy 
that would give preference and protection to persons and groups of persons that had 
been the subject of unfair competition and historical disadvantage or discrimination.3 
                                                          
1 Kenya’s constitution was subjected to a referendum on 4/8/2010. 67% of the voters approved it paving 
way for promulgation on 27/8/2010. 
2 Constitution of Kenya, 2010: Art. 227 (1) 
3 Constitution of Kenya, 2010: Art 227 (2) 
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Actuated by the constitutional imperative discussed above, the Kenyan Legislature 
moved to enact the Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Act, 2015 (PPADA)4 
essentially to ensure that the procurement legislation was brought into harmonious 
consonance with the provisions of the Constitution.  In the meantime, however, before 
the enactment of the PPADA, two executive acts (pronouncements from sitting heads 
of state) sought to bridge the transitional gap:  
In 2012, the then President of Kenya – H. E Mwai Kibaki – announced that 10% of the 
value of all government contracts was to be allocated to the youth.5 This 
announcement elicited a mostly joyous reaction from Kenyans who, mindful of the 
sorry plight of a majority of young people, thought of the initiative as a welcome 
measure calculated at checking the spiraling trend of the worrisome levels of youth 
unemployment in the country.6  In like manner, and impelled by similar motivations, 
the National Treasury, in September 2013, announced that 30% of all government 
procurement opportunities shall be set aside for the benefit of women, the youth and 
persons with disability.7 The announcement was made pursuant a directive issued by 
H.E President Uhuru Kenyatta  to that effect. This saw the expansion of the bracket of 
preference to include women and persons with disability. Why women? Why persons 
with disability?  
                                                          
4 The Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Act, No. 33 of 2015. 
5 Presidential Directive of 7/2/2012 at the 5th anniversary of the Youth Enterprise Development Fund. 
6 Kenya Country Economic Memorandum, 2016. 
7 National Treasury Circular No. 14/2013. 
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In Africa, generally, and particularly in Kenya, women are thought of as the backbone 
of rural economies.8  If any ground is to be gained in the fight against poverty, women 
have – as of necessity – to be factored into the equation of the country’s economic and 
development agenda.  
Another matter of definite equal importance concerns the plight of persons with 
disability. One major challenge facing persons with disability in Kenya, is a general 
lack of employable and entrepreneurial skills.9  Necessarily flowing out of this sorry 
state of affairs, is their unapologetic exclusion from the country’s development 
programs; this does little, if anything at all, to improve the economic independence of 
persons with disability.     
The said presidential directive saw the amendment – in 2013 – of the Public 
Procurement (Preference and Reservations) Regulations.10  In order that the said 
directive be implemented promptly and efficiently, the president launched the Access 
to Government Procurement Opportunities (AGPO) program in October 2013. The 
objective of this program is to offer facilitation to enterprises owned by women, 
persons with disability and the youth, so that they are better placed to participate 
more fully in business opportunities offered by the government through public 
procurement. This initiative would have the effect of shielding the target enterprises 
from competition posed by more established firms. 11   
                                                          
8 State of Food and Agriculture (SOFA) 2011 Report dedicated to Women in Agriculture, pp. 44-45. 
9 Norhasyikin Rozali et al. “Challenges faced By People with Disability for Getting Jobs: Entrepreneurship 
Solution for Unemployment” International Journal of Academic Research in Business and Social Sciences: 
2017, Vol. 7 No.3. pp. 67-71. 
10 Legal notice No. 114 of 2013. 
11 https://agpo.go.ke/  
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To concretize this initiative further, and as a show of renewed promise and vigor 
towards achieving the goal of empowering the members of the target groups, the 
Government earmarked KES. 531 billion out of its national budget of KES. 1.77 trillion 
from its 2015/2016 allocation for the needs of the target groups.12 
1.2 Research Problem 
It is estimated that up to 15-25% of the developing countries’ Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) goes into the procurement of goods and services as well as the carrying out of 
other public works. Further, that up to at least 50% of developing countries’  GDP goes 
into total government expenditure.13 According to the Institute of Economic Affairs, 
Kenyan Government procurement expenditure has steadily maintained an upward 
trajectory across the last decade, from 15.3% of GDP in 2008/09 to 19.5% of GDP in 
2016/17.14    
The Public Procurement Regulatory Authority (PPRA) report for 2015/16 revealed 
that out of a cumulative budgetary allocation of KES. 87 Billion attributable to 156 
procuring entities on the national government grid, only KES. 18.7 Billion was 
reserved for the targeted groups. Concerning county governments, the report shows 
that procuring entities with an aggregate budget of KES. 28.8 Billion, reserved KES. 
6.2 Billion to the targeted groups. “Cumulatively, the two levels of government 
                                                          
12 People Unlimited “Kenya’s Efforts to Empower Women, Youth and Persons with Disability through Public 
Procurement.” Hivos Report, pp. 6-8. 
13 Knack, Stephen; Biletska, Nataliya; Kacker, Kanishka. 2017. “Deterring Kickbacks and Encouraging 
Entry in Public Procurement Markets: Evidence from Firm Surveys in 88 Developing Countries” (English). 
Policy Research Working Paper; no. WPS 8078. Washington, D.C.  World Bank Group, pp. 87-93. 
14 Institute of Economic Affairs, Budget analysis 2018, (June 2018) at pg. 4 
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reported to have reserved a total of KES. 24.8 billion representing 21.5% of the total 
annual procurement budget of KES. 115 billion.”15  No doubt, 21.5% fundamentally 
falls short of the requisite 30% statutory minimum requirement. More importantly, 
and as will be developed later in this research, the 21.5% compliance indicator may 
not be truly reflective of the actual uptake of the AGPO quota reserved for the special 
interest groups. Some members of the special interest groups are used by more 
established business enterprises merely as a front, a disguise or a façade to gain the 
AGPO certification, whereas, in actual fact, the entity in question is owned and run by 
people who are not eligible to be accorded preference under the program.   
Whence emerges the disconnect? This question is the catapult – as it were - that 
launches us into the specifics of this research initiative. 
1.3 Research Objectives 
This study therefore, seeks to investigate and interrogate how the AGPO eligibility 
criteria, coupled with the registration requirements under the AGPO program have 
contributed to the obvious lapse that presents itself either as an implementation gap 
or as a misstatement of the compliance levels in the AGPO initiative. As will be 
discussed later on in this chapter, available material in this study area suggests that 
findings from various research initiatives conducted on this topic have been 
inconclusive and have majorly concentrated on the negative role played by procuring 
entities in orchestrating non-compliance. No known research has tilted the lens to 
                                                          
15 Institute of Economic Affairs, Budget analysis 2018, (June 2018) at pg. 9.  
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focus on the role (if any) that the current AGPO eligibility criteria or the registration 
requirements under the AGPO program have played in compounding the complexity 
of the non-compliance problem.  
This study therefore proposes to take advantage of this open research horizon in a bid 
to answer various emergent fundamental questions. The research will explore, in 
detail, the legal and regulatory framework that anchors public procurement in Kenya. 
Borrowing from the preference and reservation programs in the United States and 
South African jurisdictions, this research will draw comparisons and suggest possible 
improvements to the Kenyan AGPO initiative. The study will ultimately propose and 
recommend solutions to any gaps – as regards the eligibility criteria and registration 
requirements under the AGPO program - that may emerge in the course of the 
research.      
1.4 Hypotheses 
1. There is a relationship between the AGPO eligibility criteria and registration 
requirements for special interest groups and the success of the AGPO initiative. 
2. Specific changes in the AGPO registration requirements could facilitate the 
achievement of better AGPO compliance levels.    
3. Specific changes in the AGPO eligibility criteria could help achieve better 
participation by members of the special interest groups in the AGPO program.   
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1.5 Research Questions 
1. What relationship exists between the AGPO registration requirements and the 
non-compliance by the Government and other public institutions to the 30% 
statutory reservation rule under the AGPO initiative? 
2. What legislative changes in the AGPO registration requirements would first, 
achieve and then ensure continued sustainability of optimal AGPO compliance 
levels?  
3. What legislative changes in the AGPO eligibility criteria would help achieve 
better participation by members of the special interest groups in the AGPO 
program?  
1.6 Conceptual Framework 
A good public procurement system should not only endeavor to be transparent, fair, 
equitable cost-effective and competitive,16 it should also provide for a system that 
allows persons and groups of persons who have been the subject of historical 
disadvantage by reason of unfair competition and discrimination,17 to be given 
preference and protection when awarding government contracts. 
Any system of public procurement that seeks to promote the participation of members 
of certain special interest groups should ensure not only that the parameters for 
eligibility under the preference and reservation scheme are properly defined, but also 
                                                          
16 Constitution of Kenya, 2010: Art. 227(1). 
17 Constitution of Kenya, 2010: Art. 227(4). 
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that it adopts a registration procedure for the special interest groups that will achieve 
overall efficiency. A preference and reservation program that does not incorporate 
watertight eligibility criteria, or one whose registration requirements are 
unnecessarily cumbersome will invariably fail to achieve its target reservation 
threshold.  
The Kenyan public procurement legal regime adopts a preference and reservation 
scheme that is aimed at facilitating certain special interest groups - being, women, 
persons with disability and the youth, as well as enterprises owned by members of 
these groups – so that they are placed at a better position to be able to take part in 
government tendering opportunities through public procurement while being 
shielded from possible competition posed by more established firms.  
This initiative is implemented through the AGPO program; under this program, 30% 
of all procurement by both the county and national governments should be reserved 












Figure II:  Illustration of how AGPO Registration Requirements and Eligibility 
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1.7 Theoretical Framework 
1.7.1 Introduction 
The research identified two broad theories that would hold and support the 
essence of this study; these are the affirmative action theory and the 
empowerment theory. These theories were selected because they offered a better 
understanding of this research topic and would therefore provide the required 
guidance in the course of conducting the study.  
Both theories support and advance the notion of preference and as such are well 
suited to guide this study.   
1.7.2 Affirmative Action Theory 
The correct response to a probative question that seeks a universal definition to the 
concept of affirmative action may be illusive, largely because although it is a concept 
of widespread usage, affirmative action does not have an official legal definition. For 
our purposes however, we shall adopt the definition crafted by Marc Bossuyt, special 
rapporteur of the United Nations. He defines affirmative action as a “coherent packet of 
measures, of a temporary character, aimed specifically at correcting the position of a target 
group in one or more aspects of their social life, in order to obtain effective equality.”18  
The proponents19 of the affirmative action theory justify the adoption and usage of 
affirmative action techniques as a corrective and remedial measure against past 
                                                          
18 Elviria Dominguez Redondo, “United Nations Approach to Temporary Special Measures”, Journal of Law. 
December 2018, Pp. 67-78. 
19 Kojima F., “School choice: Impossibilities for Affirmative Action”, Games and Economic Behaviour, Vol. 
72, July 2012, pp. 685-693  
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injustices and wrongs whose negative effects have cascaded forwards in the time 
continuum, into the present, and with a real possibility of spilling over into the 
foreseeable future. Affirmative action, they argue, helps to reverse this undesirable 
trend and creates a more positive and beneficial future for all.20  
Another lens through which the affirmative action theorists view its utility is as a 
motivational tool. They maintain that members of a minority group who, by virtue of 
affirmative action have certain benefits accruing to them and are now occupants of 
positions of influence – so to speak – are viewed by other members of the group as 
role models and objects of emulation.21  
Affirmative action as a theory is however not without criticism. The critics argue that 
properly implemented, affirmative action as a policy was intended to achieve equality 
of status for all – to end individual discrimination as well as facilitate and engender 
equality.22  They note that there have however been instances of abuse with the result 
that rather than pursue its proper end – equality – affirmative action has essentially 
mutated into what is now seen as a policy that not only acknowledges and endorses 
preference for minorities, but one that also ultimately actively pursues favoritism.23  
This, affirmative action opponents argue, is the very definition of discrimination. They 
press the argument further: affirmative action in its corrupted state – they say – 
                                                          
20 Joel Thomas Tierno, “On the Justification of Affirmative Action” Public Affairs Quarterly Vol. 21, No. 3 
(Jul. 2007), pp.56-62.  
21 Joel Thomas Tierno, “On the Justification of Affirmative Action” Public Affairs Quarterly Vol. 21, No. 
3 (Jul. 2007), pp.56-62. 
22 Hellmers, Kimberly, “Affirmative Action: A Contradiction of Theory and Practise”, Centre for the Study 
of Ethics in Society Papers, (1998), Paper 46. 
23 Iddo Landau, “Are You Entitled to Affirmative Action?” International Journal of Applied Philosophy, 
(1997) vol. 11. No. 2. 
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undermines character and competence as it creates the expectation of being granted 
preference merely on account of group status.24 
1.7.3 Empowerment Theory 
Empowerment theory is a construct that aspires to draw a correlational link between 
individual or group (as the case may be) strengths and social policy and ultimately to 
societal change.25  Empowerment theorists postulate that the wellbeing of individuals 
or members of a specified group is intricately tied up with the circumstances obtaining 
in their larger surrounding, being the reality of their social and political 
environment.26  The goal of empowerment-oriented interventions is not only to 
generally foster and stimulate a positive impact so far as surmounting challenges is 
concerned, it also takes on the character of making sure that opportunities that would 
foster knowledge and skills development are made available to participants through 
involvement in programs that are specifically designed to attain that purpose.27  
Definitions of the concept of empowerment abound. There is however a golden thread 
of bedrock foundational values that cuts across all definitions. First off, empowerment 
is conceptualized as an intentional and / or deliberate undertaking. Next, it assumes 
                                                          
24 Iddo Landau, “Are You Entitled to Affirmative Action?” International Journal of Applied Philosophy, 
(1997) vol. 11. No. 2. 
25 Rappaport J, ‘’Terms of Empowerment/Exemplars of Prevention: Towards a Theory for Community 
Psychology” American Journal of Community Psychology (1987), 15(2). 
26 Rappaport J, ‘’Terms of Empowerment/Exemplars of Prevention: Towards a Theory for Community 
Psychology” American Journal of Community Psychology (1987), 12 (7). 
27 Rappaport J, “In Praise of Paradox: A Social Policy of Empowerment over Prevention.” American Journal 
of Community Psychology (1987) 9 (1). 
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the character of a process as distinguished from a one-off event, that is, by its very 
nature, empowerment is ongoing.  
The aim of the process espoused by the empowerment theory, the proponents 
maintain, is to get the participants – who invariably tend to be people lacking an equal 
share of valued resources or opportunities – to a place of greater access to those 
opportunities.28  By its very nature, empowerment presupposes a collaborative effort 
to achieve certain goals. It also demands a level of determined effort by the 
participants if they are to benefit from the resources in question. A keen appreciation 
of the social-political environment is also a key prerequisite if the empowerment 
initiative is to attain even the lowest level of success.29   
1.8 Literature Review 
1.8.1 Introduction  
This is a survey of scholarly sources on the research topic. It provides an overview of 
current knowledge of the topic and identifies gaps in the existing research, which have 
inspired this particular research. 
The section therefore evaluates and analyses publications, both books and journal 
articles, that relate to the research topic.  
                                                          
28 Yve S. A. “Youth Participation in Empowerment Planning Studies of Individual, Organizational and 
Community Change.” Doctoral dissertation. University of Michigan, (2001). 
29 Zimmerman M., “Empowerment Theory: Psychological, Organizational and Community Levels of Analysis.” 
New York Plenum Press, June 2000, Pp. 511-523. 
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1.8.2 Literature Analysis 
Piga and Treumer30 analyze the public policy arguments underpinning the social-
economic preferences in the United States federal public procurement. He notes that 
the federal statutes that establish social economic preferences do so because the 
government is keen on advancing the interests of small businesses when practical. To 
achieve this policy, the federal government agencies are encouraged to follow two 
guiding principles, that is, to offer the highest possible practical opportunity for small 
businesses to take part in contracts floated by federal agencies, or to incentivize the 
placement of a fair proportion of their procurements, including direct or ‘prime’ 
contracts and sub-contracts (provided that such sub-contracts are necessary for the 
performance of the federal prime contracts, even though there is no privity of contract 
between the federal government and the subcontractor), with small business concerns. 
To achieve this goal, Congress has established contracting and subcontracting goals. 
the federal law has also established preferences of certain federal public procurements 
to small businesses such as women owned small businesses. To this end, the federal 
government has set up various social economic programs, including, the small 
disadvantaged business program, the historically underutilized business zone, the 
service-disabled veteran-owned small business program, the women owned small 
business program, among others.   
                                                          




Kathleen Mee31 makes a case for preference to be extended to businesses owned by 
women when awarding procurement contracts. She considers the federal 
government’s initiative to set up a procurement program whose target constituency 
is small businesses owned by women. While she lauds this scheme, she yet considers 
certain proposals that need to be implemented if the program is to attain successful 
implementation. She recommends the implementation of a mentor-apprentice 
program aimed specifically at women owned small businesses, coordinating outreach 
programs among agencies, and creating incentives to encourage government 
contracting officials to choose to contract with women owned small businesses.   
On his part, Max V. Kidalova32 undertakes a comparative analysis of small business 
contracting in the public procurement framework. He analyses the various policy 
considerations that motivate the preferences that government accords to small 
businesses in its procurement of goods and services. He also outlines the various tools 
that have been adopted by governments in the implementation of the preference 
initiatives.  
In “The end of an ara? How affirmative action in government contracting can survive 
after “Rothe.””33  Trent Taylor discusses the United States of America Supreme 
Court’s growing conservatism in its treatment of affirmative action in relation to 
public procurement, advancing the argument that the Supreme Court’s restrictive 
                                                          
31 Mee K., “Improving Opportunities for Women-Owned Small Businesses in Federal Contracting: Current 
Efforts, Remaining Challenges, and Proposals for the Future”, Public Contract Law Journal, Vol. 41, No. 3 
(2012) Pp. 79 – 93. 
32 Kidolva M. V., “Small Business Contracting in the United States and Europe: A Comparative Assessment”, 
Public Contract Law Journal, Vol. 40, No. 2 (2011), Pp. 117 - 132. 
33 Trent Taylor “The End of an Era? How Affirmative Action in Government Contracting can Survive after 
“Rothe.”” Public Contract Law Journal, Vol. 39, N0. 4 (Summer 2010), Pp. 67 – 94.    
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approach has led to the decline in opportunities for minority businesses in the 
government procurement market. 
It is worth noting however, that although the thread of the principles underlying 
affirmative action cuts across all legal jurisdictions, there still remains an obvious 
divergence in the particularities of what constitutes “Minority Groups” when 
comparing the two procurement contexts. In the U.S, for instance, unlike in Kenya, 
affirmative action policies are largely centered and revolve around racial 
underpinnings with the result that the proposed contextual solutions to the problem 
at hand may not reasonably – even practically – be inferred or approximated into the 
Kenyan contextual reality.  
Sean A. Sabin, in his article, “Rethinking the presumption of social economic 
disadvantage”34, traces back the history of affirmative action within the context of 
procurement programs in the United States of America and as has already been 
pointed out, affirmative action in this geographical context assumes a largely racial 
perspective. He goes further to consider the U.S’s Small Business Act and president 
Nixon’s Executive Order - 11,518 of 1970, which had as its essential purpose, the 
objective of facilitating, assisting counselling and protecting the interests of small 
business enterprises; the said executive order required the Small Business Act to 
consider the needs and interests of marginalized groups that sought to enter into the 
mainstream business community. The author then shifts the focus of his mind to 
address the question of presumption of social and economic disadvantage and lays 
                                                          
34 Sean A. Sabin “Rethinking the presumption of social economic disadvantage”, Public Contract Law Journal 
Vol. 33, No. 4 (Summer 2004), Pp. 81 – 103. 
17 
 
down an elaborate discussion of what seems like a systematic attack on the 
presumption of social and economic disadvantage on a judicial platform.  
The research then considers the statutory implementation of the “Small 
Disadvantaged Business Program” which is a creature of the Small Business Act.  
What follows after the discussion is a detailed – blow by blow – analysis of the two 
major cases (“Adarand” and “Rothe”) that have impactfully sought to challenge 
affirmative action in government procurement, with considerable success.  
 The author then, by way of recommendation, puts forth a proposition that suggests 
that each minority group that the preference programs assist, should be examined in 
detail in order to establish if indeed, there is compelling interest that should justify a 
show of special treatment from the government.  
Ayres and Vars in “Does private discrimination justify public affirmative action?”35  
advance an argument that seeks to undo the undesirable ravages of private 
discrimination. They propose three justifications for this remedial exercise, all the 
while, taking care that the corrective venture does not burden “innocent” third parties. 
The article is a compelling demonstration that pits its core argument against the fast-
held, often widespread, beliefs that paint affirmative action as an illogical and 
implausible strategy when dealing with private discrimination. The article then 
                                                          
35 Ayres I., Vars F. E., “Does private discrimination justify public affirmative action?” Columbia Law Review, 
Vol. 98, N0. 7 (Nov. 1998), Pp. 12 – 23. 
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narrows down its focus to concentrate on affirmative action in government 
procurement.  
Like the other pieces of literature sourced from beyond the local jurisdiction, the ideas 
contained in this article also present the all too familiar challenge of unrelatability 
owing to disparities in the different contextual circumstances and realities of the 
countries under review.    
We now switch gears to navigate the terrain of available literature in our local 
procurement landscape. In his article, “Factors Influencing Government Procurement 
Opportunities for Disadvantaged groups in Public Institutions,”36 Stephen and 
Gabriel explored a variety of contributors albeit at an acutely narrowed down level 
of resolution – focusing only on one public institution: Kenya Ports Authority. 
In much the same way, Masud, Nzulwa and Kwena analyzed the challenges facing 
procurement performance within parastatals in Kenya, with a special eye on the 
National Construction Authority.37  
The Hivos report of 201838 carries out an analysis intended to assess the effect of the 
AGPO initiative on the youth. The report also undertakes some level of comparative 
                                                          
36 Chepsoiyo S., Lubale G., “Factors Influencing Government Procurement Opportunities for Disadvantaged 
groups in Public Institutions”, International Journal of Advanced Research, Issue No. 2320-5407, Pp. 137 
– 159. 
37 Aden M.; Nzulwa J.; Kwena R., “Factors Influencing Government Procurement Opportunities for 
Disadvantaged groups in Public Institutions”, The Strategic Journal of Business & Change Management, 
Vol. 3, Issue 4, Article 62.     
38“Kenya’s Efforts to Empower Women, Youth and Persons with Disability through Public 
Procurement”, Hivos Report, 2018. 
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analysis with the other groups of preference, being women and persons with 
disability, albeit at a very basic level.  
Aside from considering the gains of the AGPO program, the report identifies some 
factors that pose a challenge to its implementation, including, complex procurement 
procedures; high bid, proposal and compliance costs as well as very technical 
procurement criteria which require specialized bidding skills that may not be 
available among members of the preference groups. 
The report does not however consider the registration process or eligibility criteria for 
the groups of preference, which is the special focus of this research.      
In ‘Participation of Women Entrepreneurs in Government Procurement - Kenya 
Perspective’39 Ms. Ndekei explores the challenges faced by women entrepreneurs in 
accessing government procurement opportunities in Kenya. Some of the identified 
challenges include delayed payments which in turn affect cash flow, limited access to 
public procurement and disposal information, limited market information for some 
goods, centralization of government office in Nairobi, lack of adequate technical skills 
required in carrying out certain public procurement contracts as well as cumbersome 
application processes.  
Yet again, this research does not tackle the possible challenges posed by or inherence 
in the eligibility criteria and the registration process under the AGPO program.    
                                                          
39Ndekei G., “Participation of Women Entrepreneurs in Government Procurement- Kenya Perspective”, 
International Journal of Advanced Research, November 2018, Pp. 134 - 152. 
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In “Government Procurement and Affirmative Action: Access to Government 
Public Procurement Opportunities for Women, Youth and Persons with 
Disabilities”40, Prof. Tabitha K. Nganga analyses the legal and institutional 
frameworks that anchor the AGPO program. She considers the areas of reservation 
under the AGPO program, the part played by public procurement entities in achieving 
the objectives of the AGPO program, as well as the challenges that the AGPO initiative 
encounters; the research concludes by suggesting possible solutions to the identified 
challenges. She also singles out financial constraints, bureaucratic and opaque 
procurement procedures, lack of knowledge of the law by procurement officers, lack 
of coordination between Treasury and the Public Procurement Regulatory Authority 
as well as high transport costs, as the challenges facing the implementation of the 
AGPO initiative.  
The research does not however, deal with the eligibility criteria of the preference 
groups or the registration requirements under the AGPO program.   
On his part, Muraguri J. T in “Implementation of The Youth Preference and 
Reservations Policy in Public Procurement: The Case of State Owned Enterprises 
in Nairobi”41 discusses the enactment of the of the policy that addresses preference 
for the youth and youth-owned enterprises in relation to public procurement, in a bid 
to establish the extent to which the youth preference and reservations policy has been 
                                                          
40 Nganga T. K. Prof., “Government Procurement and Affirmative Action: Access to Government Public 
Procurement Opportunities for Women, Youth and Persons with Disabilities”, International Journal of 
Advanced Research, June 2019, Pp. 15 -27. 
41 Muraguri J. T “Implementation of the Youth Preference and Reservations Policy in Public 
Procurement: The Case of State Owned Enterprises in Nairobi”, Doctoral Thesis 2013. 
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mainstreamed. Although he considers institutional and legislative challenges that 
plague the implementation of the preference and reservations policy, he nonetheless 
does not address his mind to matters that concern eligibility and registration of the 
special interest groups, nor does he look into the other groups of preference, being 
women and persons with disability.   
1.9 Research Methodology and Approaches 
This thesis employed non-numerical research methods which do not involve 
statistical analyses of data.  
A brief description of each method is given below: 
The doctrinal approach: at this stage, the thesis describes in detail the available 
foundational legal underpinnings of the chosen area of study. Here, this research 
analyzes constitutional provisions, specific pieces of legislation and relevant 
procurement regulations. In the end, this section provides a comprehensive statement 
of the law. 
Upon analysis of the provisions in the Constitution, legislation and regulations that 
govern this study’s research area, the thesis then seeks to identify and single out the 
particular provisions in law, including any gaps therein, to point out possible 
deficiencies and problematic areas – with specific regard to the AGPO eligibility 




Case study analysis: the thesis also looks to the preference and reservation legal 
frameworks in other jurisdictions in a bid to get different perspectives concerning the 
different ways that other legal systems have addressed the various problems -  
touching on eligibility and registration under the preferential systems - identified in 
Kenya’s procurement (preference and reservation) legal regime. The research then 
suggests possible lessons to be learned from the selected case study jurisdictions, that 
is, what useful items could be borrowed and what potential pitfalls should be avoided.   
The primary sources of data in this research include, the Constitution of Kenya, 2010, 
various local legislations, various legislations from South Africa and the United States 
of America. The research also obtained data and information from other secondary 
sources, including reports and journal articles. Access to these resources was made 
possible by visits to various physical and online institutional libraries, relevant 
websites and general desktop research.                               
1.10 Chapter Breakdown 
Over and above outlining the structure, this chapter has also captured the substance 
of the research proposal. It has developed the research problem, the hypotheses, 
research questions, conceptual framework, theoretical framework, literature review 
and the research methodology.  
Chapter two provides a thorough evaluation of the legal framework upon which the 
Kenyan public procurement regime is anchored. The chapter examines the 
constitutional provisions relating to procurement, the provisions contained in 
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procurement statues as well as the regulations included in other subsidiary legislation 
and the special part they play in putting the AGPO initiative into operation, noting to 
identify the various implementation gaps and certain other areas of concern, with a 
special focus on the eligibility criteria and the registration requirements and processes 
under the AGPO program. 
Chapter three is a case study of selected procurement legal systems and how these 
regimes have implemented their preferential public procurement systems. The 
chapter considers the preferential procurement systems of the United States of 
America and that of South Africa. The United States of America jurisdiction was 
selected because of its rich and elaborate history of affirmative action programs 
centred around public procurement. It therefore provides a tested, mature and 
concrete statutory outlook into public procurement (preference and reservation) 
schemes.  
South Africa, although it does not pride itself with a long history of affirmative action 
practices, has nonetheless adopted a very aggressive public procurement (preference 
and reservation) program. Further, Kenya looked to South Africa in its quest to amend 
its constitution; as a matter of fact, the public procurement principles enshrined in 
Article 227 of Kenya’s constitution were borrowed from South Africa’s constitution.  




Chapter four discusses the various complexities in the AGPO eligibility and 
registration processes that have emerged in the course of conducting this research, in 
a bid to explore possible solutions to the identified difficulties.     
Finally, aside from concluding the study, chapter five also offers a summary of the 





2 CHAPTER TWO: KENYA’S PUBLIC 
PROCUREMENT (PREFERENCE AND 
RESERVATION) LEGAL AND REGULATORY 
FRAMEWORK 
 
2.1 Introduction  
The Constitution of Kenya, 2010 requires that when engaging in any form of 
procurement activity, the Government should do so in manner that is congruent with 
the principles of good financial governance, that is, guided by a system that is cost 
efficient, accountable and transparent.42  
Accordingly, following the entrenchment of public procurement principles in the 
Constitution of Kenya 2010, there was necessity to review the public procurement 
legal regime with a view to aligning it with the constitutional imperative.43 The review 
culminated in the enactment of the Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Act, 2015 
and the attendant Public Procurement and Disposal Regulations (PPDR), effectively 
repealing the Public Procurement and Disposal Act, 2005 and all other laws that had 
hitherto, governed public procurement in Kenya. Also affected by the wave of review, 
were the Public Procurement and Disposal (Preference and Reservations) Regulations, 
2011. These were amended in 2013 by the Public Procurement and Disposal 
(Preference and Reservations) (Amendment) Regulations, 2013. 
                                                          
42 Constitution of Kenya, 2010, Chapter 12. 
43 Ochieng J.; Muehle M., “Development and Reform of the Kenyan Public Procurement System” Public Law 
Journal, 2014, Pp. 90 - 105. 
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The new regime was intended to usher in a strong legal framework upon which sound 
public procurement processes could find firm anchorage.44 The aim of this chapter is 
therefore to analyze each of the identified legal instruments in a bid to interrogate 
how, and to what extent, they seek to improve access to public procurement 
opportunities by women, persons with disability and the youth.  
The diagram below serves to illustrate the interplay of the various legal instruments 
within Kenya’s public procurement system.       
Figure III:  Legal Framework Underpinning Kenya’s Public Procurement System 
 
  
                                                          
44 Kiarahu M., “Participation of minorities and marginalised groups in the Kenyan economy: reforming public 
procurement law” International Journal of Advanced Research, June 2013, Pp. 67 - 74. 
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2.2 The Constitution 
The current Kenyan Constitution45, replaced the 1969 Constitution; this had in turn 
taken the place of the 1963 Independence Constitution. The Constitution provides that 
use of public money should be informed by prudence and responsibility, in addition 
to making provisions that require special regard to be had to marginalized groups and 
areas.46   
Part XII of the Constitution is titled Public Finance and it deals with procurement of 
public goods and services.47 It enjoins every state organ or any other public entity, 
when contracting for goods and / or services, to do so in accordance with a system 
that is fair equitable, transparent competitive and cost effective. It goes further to 
require that the National Assembly pass legislation that would prescribe a structure 
within and around which policies relating to procurement and asset disposal shall be 
implemented. The constitution requires the said legislation to make provision for 
certain classes that will benefit from and enjoy formal preference in the allotment of 
contracts, as well as providing for the protection and progress of persons or groups 
that had previously been the subject of discrimination and unfair competition.48 
Parliament dutifully heeded the constitutional call and in 2015, enacted a new 
procurement law49 that came into effect in 2016. We consider this legislation in the 
discussion that follows. 
                                                          
45 Constitution of Kenya, 2010. 
46 Constitution of Kenya, 2010, Article 201. 
47 Constitution of Kenya, 2010, Article 227. 
48 Constitution of Kenya, 2010, Article 227 (2). 
49 The Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Act, 2015. 
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Public procurement entails the use and application of public funds. The constitutional 
tenets of good governance, integrity, transparency and accountability particularly in 
public finance are also demanded of public institutions under Art. 201 of the 
Constitution which requires that the use of public funds must at all times be prudent, 
responsible and strictly for public good. 
Also relevant in this research, is Article 27 of the Constitution. It requires the State to 
take, among others, legislative interventions to remedy any prejudice suffered by 
individuals or groups as a result of historical bias and discrimination. Article 56 
further requires the state to put in place affirmative action programmes designed to 
ensure that minorities and marginalized groups are accorded special opportunities in, 
among other spheres, the economic field. 
2.3 The Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Act 
The current legislative framework for public procurement is the Public Procurement 
and Asset Disposal Act (PPADA), 2015 and the relevant regulations50. 
The shift from the earlier regime – the Public Procurement and Disposal Act – to the 
PPADA was mainly driven by the need to ensure that the procurement legislation was 
brought into conformity with the Constitutional requirements51.  
                                                          
50 Public Procurement and Disposal Regulations and the Public Procurement and Disposal (Preference 
and Reservations) (Amendment) Regulations. 
51 Ochieng J.; Muehle M., “Development and Reform of the Kenyan Public Procurement System” Public 
Law Journal, 2014, Pp. 90 - 105. 
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The PPADA is premised upon certain guiding principles52 – most of which can trace 
their source and origin to the Constitution. These include, national values and 
principles of governance53; equality & freedom from discrimination, which includes 
affirmative action programs and policies aimed at remedying any form of unfairness 
and / or disadvantage occasioned by individuals as well as groups of people by 
reason of historical discrimination;54 affirmative action programs designed so as to 
uplift the youth as well as minority and disadvantaged groups55; principles of 
integrity56; principles of public finance57 which emphasizes the need to take certain 
deliberate action to empower marginalized groups and areas;  and principles of public 
service.58  
The application of the PPADA is far reaching. It encompasses all state organs and 
public entities throughout the course of the procurement process.59 It enjoins the 
Public Procurement Regulatory Authority (PPRA) a body created under the Act, to 
create a data base that contains information relating to complaints made on procuring 
entities; price comparisons for goods, services and works; a record of those prohibited 
from participating in tenders or those debarred; State organs and public entities that 
are non-compliant with procurement laws; market prices of goods, services and 
                                                          
52 The Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Act, 2015, Section 3. 
53 Constitution of Kenya, 2010, Article 10. 
54 Constitution of Kenya, 2010, Article 27. 
55 Constitution of Kenya, 2010, Article 55 and 56. 
56 The Leadership and Integrity Act, No. 19 of 2012.  
57 Constitution of Kenya, 2010, Article 201. 
58 Constitution of Kenya, 2010, Article 232. 
59 Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Act, Section 4.  
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works; benchmarked prices; statistics related to public procurement and asset 
disposal; and any other relevant procurement information.  
Regrettably though, the PPRA does not maintain the required database, especially as 
concerns public entities which have failed to comply with the requirement that all 
public entities reserve 30% of their procurement opportunities to special interest 
groups, being women, persons with disability and the youth. In the same vein, 
important procurement statistics and reports maintained by the Authority are not up 
to date, the last published annual report being for the year 2016.     
The PPADA also contains particular provisions on preference and reservations of 
public procurement contracts. These provisions trace their origin to the authority 
conferred by the Constitution under Article 227(2). The preference and reservations 
provisions are stated to take preeminence over all other provisions contained in the 
PPADA with an injunction that all procurement entities shall comply with them.60 
However, as will be discussed later in this study, the Public Procurement Regulatory 
Authority (PPRA) which is the institutional regulator of public procurement matters, 
is not endowed with enforcement powers; its role is limited to monitoring and 
reporting compliance and this, without a doubt, undermines the achievement of the 
PPADA’s objectives.   
The PPADA enjoins the Cabinet Secretary of Treasury to formulate and publish 
modalities of preferences and or reservations in public procurement and asset 
disposal which preferences shall take into account, social and economic development 
                                                          
60 Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Act, Section 155. 
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factors61. The Act requires every public procuring entity to ensure that not less than 
30% of the finances set aside for procurement during each financial year is reserved 
for the benefit of women, persons with disability and the youth.62 Within the meaning 
of the PPADA, the following institutions, among others, qualify as public procuring 
entities: both the national and county government as well as their various departments 
and organs; courts and the Judiciary; Independent Offices and Constitutional 
Commissions and parastatals.63 
To monitor compliance with the above requirements, the PPADA requires all 
procuring entities to provide data, every six months, to the PPRA; the data should be 
disaggregated to indicate the number of youth, women and persons with disability 
whose goods and services have been procured by the procuring entity64. The PPRA is 
then required to compile a report, based on the data presented by the procuring 
entities, and table it before Parliament, every six months. Included in the report, 
should be particulars the procuring entities and their compliance levels with the 
preference and reservation requirements.  
Unfortunately, as has already been mentioned and as will be discussed in chapter 4 of 
this research, the first and last published annual report by the PPRA relates to the 
period covering the first year of the PPADA coming into effect, that is, the year 2015 
/ 2016. 
                                                          
61 Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Act, Section 157(2). 
62 Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Act, Section 157(10). 
63 Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Act, Section 2. 
64 Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Act, Section 157(12) (b). 
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The Cabinet Secretary is further empowered by the PPADA65 to come up with 
prescribed preferences that will help in attaining the statutory 30% quota. Such 
prescription by the Cabinet Secretary is geared towards achieving the goals of Article 
55 as read together with Article 227(2) of the Constitution. The Cabinet Secretary, 
acting pursuant to this power, prescribed five registration categories under which the 
youth, women and persons with disabilities would obtain preferential treatment in 
public procurement, namely: General Supplies, ICT Services, Professional Services 
and Consultancy, Small works and Engineering as well as Fresh Produce & 
Agricultural Produce66. Although the special interest group entities are limited to 
submitting bids for tenders only in the specified categories, interestingly enough, 
neither the PPADA nor the PPADR specify the categories for which they cannot 
submit bids; as a matter of fact, these are undefined. This limitation locks the special 
interest groups from participating in a wide range of procurement opportunities.     
While the intention of prescribing the five categories was noble and aimed at 
promoting the economic and social welfare of members of the special interest groups, 
it has been argued that it has, regrettably, been counterproductive in its 
implementation. This categorization has created unnecessary impediments that have 
prevented the registered entities from taking full advantage of tendering 
opportunities which do not fall under their registered category but which they, 
nonetheless, have the capacity to undertake successfully67.  
                                                          
65 Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Act, Section 157(15). 
66 Public Procurement and Disposal (Preference and Reservations) (Amendment) Regulations, 2013. 
67 Ochieng J.; Muehle M., “Development and Reform of the Kenyan Public Procurement System” Public 
Law Journal, 2014, Pp. 90 - 105. 
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This aspect of the mode of registering special interest groups has been fronted as a 
contributor to the low compliance levels, by public entities, with the specified 30% 
reservation quota. 
2.4 Procurement Regulations and the AGPO Program. 
2.4.1 The Public Procurement and Disposal (Preference and Reservations) 
Regulations. 
In 2013, H. E the President of Kenya, Uhuru Kenyatta issued a directive that saw the 
amendment of the procurement rules, so that 30% of all government procurement 
contracts would be set aside for women, persons with disability and the youth, 
thereby shielding them from the competition that would be posed established firms. 
Following this directive, the Public Procurement and Disposal (Preference and 
Reservations) Regulations, 2011, were amended in 2013 by the Public Procurement 
and Disposal (Preference and Reservations) (Amendment) Regulations of 2013. 
The Regulations require all public procuring entities to set aside and allocate at least 
30% of the finances that they have earmarked for procurement, and to use that money 
to obtain services and procure goods from enterprises that belong to women, the 
youth and persons with disability. In order to implement this directive, procurement 
entities are required to make appropriate provision for it not only in their budgets, but 
also in their procurement plans. The PPRA further requires the said procuring entities 
to submit reports detailing their compliance, after every quarter.68   
                                                          
68 Public Procurement and Disposal (Preference and Reservations) (Amendment) Regulations, 2013, 
Regulation 31 (1). 
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The Regulations also prescribe a formal qualification criterion for entities that wish to 
be registered under the AGPO preference program. As pertains business entities 
owned by women, youth and persons with disability, the regulations require that such 
enterprises shall be legal entities (that is to say, companies, partnerships or sole 
proprietorships) that are registered with the government body responsible for such 
matters and that have at least 70% membership – either in terms of partners or 
shareholders - of women, youth or persons with disabilities. The leadership, that is to 
say, management and directorship posts, of the said entities shall be 100% women, 
youth and persons with disability, respectively69.  
Notwithstanding the elaborate eligibility and registration requirements, it is however 
acknowledged that the system is susceptible to abuse. A great number of 
unscrupulous traders have been known to manipulate the registration structure by 
procuring counterfeit documents and using these forged documents to register their 
companies in the names of women, persons with disability and the youth so as to gain 
access to the reserved opportunities.70 This practice deprives genuine and deserving 
members of the specified minority groups of the benefits that would rightfully accrue 
to them by virtue of their membership to the preference and reservation schemes. 
                                                          
69 Public Procurement and Disposal (Preference and Reservations) (Amendment) Regulations, 2013, 
Regulation 32 
70 Ochieng J.; Muehle M., “Development and Reform of the Kenyan Public Procurement System” Public 
Law Journal, 2014, Pp. 90 - 105. 
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2.4.2 The AGPO program 
The Access to Government Procurement Opportunities (AGPO) Program is a 
government – initiated program that seeks to facilitate target groups, being, women, 
persons with disability and youth-owned enterprises and place them at a position 
where they would be enabled to take part in public procurement with ease.  
The AGPO initiative is anchored on the affirmative action provisions of the 
Constitution71 which enjoin government to put in place both legislative as well as 
policy measures that will serve to address the economic conditions of marginalized or 
discriminated groups.  
Further, the PPADA donates powers to the National Treasury to set up and put in 
place a secretariat - the preference and reservations secretariat – that will be charged 
with the responsibility of implementing the preferences and reservations provided 
under the Act.72 It is the responsibility of the said secretariat to prequalify, register and 
certify the persons and / or categories of persons or groups that are beneficiaries to 
the preference and reservation schemes; in addition, the secretariat is also expected to 
train and build the capacity of the target groups as well as to provide technical and 
advisory support to procuring entities as they endeavor to implement the preferences 
and reservations specified under the PPADA; further still, it falls to the secretariat to 
evaluate and monitor how the preferences and reservations specified under the Act 
are being implemented.73 The AGPO program is managed by the said secretariat. 
                                                          
71 Constitution of Kenya, 2010, Article 27 (8). 
72 The Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Act, 2015, section 157 (17). 
73 Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Act, Section 157 (17). 
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The program was created in response to a directive that was issued by H. E the 
President of Kenya, Uhuru Kenyatta. This saw the amendment of the procurement 
rules, so that 30% of all government procurement contracts would be held in reserve 
for women, persons with disability and the youth, thereby shielding them from 
competition that would be posed by established firms. 
The AGPO program provides a platform on which eligible enterprises undertake 
mandatory registration before they could qualify as beneficiaries under the preference 
and reservation schemes. The requirement that such entities have at least 70% 
membership of women, persons with disability or youth and the leadership be 100% 
women, persons with disabilities or youth respectively, applies here.  
As such, those wishing to register their entities must present their national identity 
cards or Kenyan passport to act as proof of citizenship as well as proof of age with 
regard to youth enterprises; business registration certificate (in the case of sole 
proprietorships) or certificate of incorporation (in case of companies); CR12 for 
Limited Company from Registrar of Companies (this provides particulars of directors 
and shareholders of the company); partnership deed (for partnership businesses); tax 
compliance certificate (for all businesses); and certificates from the Energy Regulatory 
Commission, the National Construction Authority, or any other Authorized Public 
Technical Body for entities wishing to be registered under the construction category.  
An additional requirement applies to persons with disability and establishments 
formed by persons with disability. These will require a special registration certificate 
from the National Council for Persons with Disabilities. Obtaining this certification 
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can prove to be cumbersome for many as one is required to fill in specified forms and 
tender a medical report to the Council. The costs involved in obtaining a medical 
report may prove to be prohibitive and out of the reach of many persons with 
disability.   
What is also evident, is that this structure creates a two-tier and sometimes three-tier 
registration process consisting of normal business registration requirements for 
companies, partnerships or sole proprietorships; industry specific registration 
requirements and finally, the AGPO program registration at the National Treasury. 
These processes are by no means simple or straightforward. This difficulty is 
accentuated by the fact that the special interest groups – which are the specific target 
of the AGPO program – are not particularly endowed with adequate capacity, both in 
terms of finances and awareness, to obtain the required registration uninhibited. 
Registration necessarily entails obtaining money to pay the requisite fees for obtaining 
business registration certificates and the technical, industry-specific certification.  
In addition, most business enterprises run by special interest groups, are based in the 
rural or sub-urban areas. This presents difficulties and challenges in terms of the 
practical feasibility for them to comply with requirements such as the timely filing of 
annual returns, which in turn militates against these enterprises’ ability to secure a tax 




2.5 The Public Procurement Regulatory Authority  
Prior to the enactment of the PPADA in 2016, the Public Procurement Oversight 
Authority was the body tasked with overseeing the regulatory function of public 
procurement in Kenya. However, with the coming into effect of the PPADA, the 
situation changed massively and the regulatory function was assumed by the Public 
Procurement Regulatory Authority (PPRA).  
The functions of the PPRA are specified in the PPADA,74 and to the extent that they 
relate to this research topic, include to: monitor, assess and review the public 
procurement and asset disposal systems in a bid to ensure that they are congruent 
with the national values and other constitutional provisions and to make 
recommendations for possible improvement; report to the Cabinet Secretary and the 
county executive member for finance in each county on the overall functioning of 
procurement systems; apply any standards developed under the PPADA; monitor the 
application of the preference and reservation schemes by procuring entities; be advice 
at hand to offer any counsel and technical assistance that may be required; investigate 
and take other necessary action concerning grievances that may be lodged on 
procurement and asset disposal procedures from tenderers, procuring entities, 
contractors or the general public that are not subject of administrative review; conduct 
research on the public procurement and asset disposal structure and any 
improvements attributable to it; monitor and evaluate the preference and reservations 
provided for under the Act and prepare routine reports as prescribed; create a central 
                                                          
74 Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Act, No. 33 of 2015, Section 9 (1).  
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repository with up to date information as prescribe; liaise with state and non-state 
performers with the intention of obtaining recommendations on how public 
procurement and disposal can be enriched; and ensure that procurement entities 
implement the prescribed preferences and reservations and provide data on 
compliance to the PPRA. 
2.6 Conclusion  
This chapter has given an in-depth evaluation of the legal and regulatory framework 
upon which the Kenyan public procurement regime is anchored. The chapter has 
examined the constitutional provisions relating to procurement, the provisions of the 
Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Act – which is Kenya’s procurement statute - 
as well as the regulations included in other subsidiary legislation and the special part 
they play in putting the AGPO initiative into operation. The chapter has also identified 
various implementation gaps and certain other areas of concern, with a special focus 
on the eligibility criteria and the registration requirements and processes under the 
AGPO program.  
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3 CHAPTER THREE: LESSONS FROM OTHER 
JURISDICTIONS 
3.1 Introduction  
There are points, both of intersection and divergence, between the legal framework 
governing preference and reservations in the context of public procurement in Kenya 
and the legal frameworks obtaining in other jurisdictions. In conducting this research, 
two public procurement legal regimes, that is, the United States of America and South 
Africa have been selected as case studies in analysing the various registration 
requirements within their procurement (preference and reservation) regimes.  
As shall be discussed in this chapter, the United States of America has had a rich and 
elaborate history of affirmative action programs centred around public procurement. 
This jurisdiction was selected because it provides a tested, mature and concrete 
statutory outlook into public procurement (preference and reservation) schemes.  
On the other hand, South Africa, although it does not pride itself with a long history 
of affirmative action practices, it has nonetheless adopted a very aggressive public 
procurement (preference and reservation) program. An important fact that should 
also be highlight at this juncture, is that Kenya looked to South Africa in its quest to 
amend its constitution; as a matter of fact, the public procurement principles 
enshrined in Article 227 of Kenya’s constitution were borrowed from South Africa’s 
constitution. It therefore, makes great academic and practical sense to look to the 
South African legal regime in a bid to borrow important lessons on the 
implementation of its public procurement system.         
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This chapter will therefore discuss the salient registration characteristics of the 
procurement (preference and reservation) legal frameworks in the two selected 
jurisdictions to determine whether they can provide any lessons for our Kenya 
procurement (preference ad reservation) legal regime.      
3.2 The United States of America’s Small Business 
Administrative Initiative 
The public procurement (preference and reservation) regime in the United States is 
governed by the Small Business Act which was enacted by Congress in 1953.  
In setting procurement preferences, the United States Federal Government was 
motivated by the general philosophy of stimulating growth and providing protection 
for small businesses by seeking to boost their economic welfare.75 These preferences 
are also aimed at maintaining the spirit of competition within the public procurement 
system by adding to the pool of suppliers in the market and taming the dominance of 
the market by few established firms.76 While the United States Competition in 
Contracting Act, would normally require that federal public procuring entities obtain 
uninhibited and open competition when awarding contracts, the reservations 
prescribed under the Small Business Act take precedence; the reservation provisions 
under the Small Business Act step in to moderate the application of the full and open 
                                                          
75 Moore N.; Grammich C. A.; Mele J. D., “Small Business and Strategic Sourcing”, Rand Corporation, 
(2014), Pp. 57 - 68. 
76 Moore N.; Grammich C. A.; Mele J. D., “Small Business and Strategic Sourcing”, Rand Corporation, 
(2014), Pp. 57 - 68. 
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competition rule by requiring that this rule only apply after the reservation quota for 
small businesses has been excluded.77       
The Small Business Act created the Small Business Administration which is the 
implementing arm of the small business reservation program. The program is aimed 
at ensuring that small businesses obtain a certain prescribed ratio of contracts from 
the federal government.78  
Within the definition of ‘small business’ there are five specific categorizations, namely, 
Historically Underutilized Business Zones, small disadvantaged businesses, service-
disabled veteran-owned small businesses and women owned small businesses.79 
Currently, the prescribed reservation proportion stands at 23% with regard to small 
businesses, 5% with regard to small disadvantaged businesses, 5% with regard to 
women owned small businesses, 3% with regard to Historically Underutilized 
Business Zones and 3% with regard to service-disabled veteran-owned small 
businesses.80  
The Small Business Act enjoins the Small Business Administration to report to 
Congress and the President on the federal agencies’ and departments’ achievement of 
the prescribed reservation targets.81 To this end, the Small Business Administration 
                                                          
77 Snider K. F., Kidalov M. V., Rendon R. G., “Diversity Governance by Convenience? Federal Contracting 
for Minority-owned”, Public Administration Quarterly, Vol. 37, No. 3 (Fall 2013), Pp. 87 - 101. 
78 Small Business Act, 15 U.S.C. Chapter 14A 
79 Snider K. F., Kidalov M. V., Rendon R. G., “Diversity Governance by Convenience? Federal 
Contracting for Minority-owned”, Public Administration Quarterly, Vol. 37, No. 3 (Fall 2013), Pp. 87 - 
101. 
80 N.Y Moore, C.A Grammich, J.D Mele, “Identifying Specific Opportunities for Strategic Sourcing and 
Implications for Small-Business Procurement”, Rand Corporation (2014), Pp. 98 - 111. 
81 Small Business Act, 15 U.S.C 633, Section 4 (b) (2) A.    
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has adopted a scorecard monitoring system. Agencies that do not meet the set 
preference targets must tender a justification report for the non-compliance to the 
Small Business Administration along with a corrective plan of action detailing how 
the agency in question intends to ensure the reservation goals for the following fiscal 
year are achieved.82       
3.2.1 Eligibility and Registration Requirements 
The question of whether or not an entity qualifies for admission under the preference 
and reservation scheme is determined by the Small Business Administration. The 
baseline criterion is set by the Small Business Act.83 For a firm to be categorized as a 
small business concern, it has to conform with certain set standards in terms of size 
and socio-economic status.84 Under the Small Business Act, businesses are categorized 
differently according to specific industry standards.  
3.2.2 Certification Procedure 
 
3.2.2.1 Stage I 
The United States model of preference uses a self-certification mechanism where 
entities are required to present a written self-certification declaration to the federal 
public procuring entity. The only qualification attached to the self-certification 
declaration being, that the entity must represent – in good faith – that at the time of its 
written self-certification, it qualified as a small business. In making out the written 
self-certification, the owners of the entity should be guided by the definition of the 
                                                          
82 Sweet M. J., “Minority Business Enterprise Programmes in the United States of America: An Empirical 
Investigation”, Journal of Law and Society, Vol. 33, No. 1 (2016), Pp. 89 - 100.  
83 Small Business Act, 15 U.S.C Section 632 (a) (2006). 
84 Small Business Act, 15 U.S.C Section 637 (b) (6) (2006). 
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small business concern that is relevant to the industry where the entity seeks to be 
contracted, provided that the Small Business Administration has not previously 
determined the entity in question to be other than small.85     
3.2.2.2 Stage II 
Upon submission of the self-certification declaration by the small business entity, the 
federal public procuring entity is required to accept it and interact with it at face value 
unless: 
a. There is protestation against the certification, lodged by another bidder; or 
b. The federal procuring entity has in its possession, credible information, on 
whose basis the veracity and soundness of the self-certification declaration can 
be questioned.86  
3.2.2.3 Stage III 
An entity that successfully goes through the two stages (above) is for all intents and 
purposes considered to be a small business enterprise as concerns that specific 
procurement and will be accorded the applicable preference, taking into consideration 
its specific categorization and the specific industry of the federal public procuring 
entity. Thereupon, the entity in question will be awarded the contract, subject to a 
successful evaluation process.87  
  
                                                          
85 Federal Acquisition Regulation 19. 301-1 (a). 
86 Federal Acquisition Regulation 19. 301-1 (a).  
87 Federal Acquisition Regulation 19. 301-1 (a).  
See also Mee K., “Improving Opportunities for Women-Owned Small Businesses in Federal Contracting: 
Current Efforts, Remaining Challenges, And Proposals for the Future”, Public Contract Law Journal, Vol. 41, 
No. 3 (Spring 2012), Pp. 112 - 129.  
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Figure IV – Certification Procedure. 
 
 
3.2.3 Recertification  
Following much discussion and debate around the issue of re-certification by small 
business entities, the Small Business Administration adopted a time-based, option-
based re-certification system in 2006.88   Under this regime, all merging entities and 
those entities that are subsequently acquired by other firms subsequent to being 
contracted by the federal government on the basis of their small business status, must 
file a recertification with the federal public procuring entity and with the Small 
Business Administration, indicating their changed status.89  
                                                          
88 Code of Federal Regulations, Section 121.404 (g). 
89 Code of Federal Regulations, Section 121.404 (g). See also Sweet M. J., “Minority Business Enterprise 
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stage I - Self 
Certification
•Entity tenders a written self-certification declaration to the federal public




•Federal public procuring entity accepts the self-certification declation unless
another bidder lodges a protest or unless the procuring entity has credible
information to impeach the declartion.






Entities that are performing long term contracts are also required to tender a re-
certification before the sixth year of the contract, and thereafter, before any option is 
exercised by the contracting parties.90  
3.3 South Africa’s Broad-Based Economic Empowerment 
Strategy    
Much like the Kenyan scenario, the South African public procurement system is 
anchored on principles that are enshrined in the Constitution.91 it requires that all 
public procurement must be conducted in accordance with a system that is fair, 
equitable, transparent, competitive and cost-effective.92 It further enjoins  State organs 
to adopt a procurement policy that champions preferential treatment for persons or 
entities that, by reason of unjust discrimination in the past, have previously been 
disadvantaged.93 To achieve this goal, the Constitution enjoins parliament to enact 
legislation that will bring this provision into operation through the prescription of a 
framework within which the implementation of the preference and reservation policy 
in public procurement shall be founded.94  
Pursuant to the above constitutional imperative, the South African Legislature 
enacted the Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act of 2000 (PPPFA). This 
was followed by the promulgation of the Preferential Procurement Policy Framework 
Regulations (PPPFR) in 2011, which were subsequently amended in 2017; these 
provide guidelines for Black Economic Empowerment with regard to state tenders. 
                                                          
90 13 Code of Federal Regulations, Section 121.404 (g). 
91 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
92 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, Section 217. 
93 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, Section 217 (3).  
94 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, Section 217 (3). 
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Therefore, the substantive legal regime that governs the preference and reservations 
policy for public procurement is the PPPFA and the Regulations made thereunder, 
being, the PPPFR. These enjoin State organs to establish, execute and administer a 
public procurement system that adopts certain targeted mechanisms aimed at 
achieving the specific goal of contract reservation in favour of disadvantaged and / 
or marginalised individuals and / or groups.95 
Also relevant in this regard, is the Public Finance Management Act96 which charges 
accounting authorities for national and provincial entities as well public entities to 
maintain, within their respective departments or entities, an appropriate procurement 
system which is fair, equitable, transparent, competitive and cost-effective.97 The 
implementing regulations under this Act are the National Treasury Regulations.      
Working closely with the Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act, is the 
Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act of 2003 (B-BBEEA). This is a sector-
specific legislation which contains binding guidelines on how to boost the 
involvement of historically marginalized or disadvantaged groups in public 
procurement, generally, but also in particular sectors. The B-BBEEA contains 
mathematical formulations for the calculation of a special rating of black 
empowerment, dabbed, the Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment (B-BBEE) 
score.98  
                                                          
95 Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act, 2000, Section 3; Preferential Procurement Policy 
Framework, 2017, Regulations 6 and 7. 
96 Public Finance Management Act, No. 1 of 1999. 
97 Public Finance Management Act, Section 51 (1) (a). 
98 Phoebe Bolton, “The Public Procurement System in South Africa: Main Characteristics”, Public Contract 
Law Journal, Vol. 37, No. 4 (Summer 2017), Pp. 76 - 89. 
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It is this score mark that is used by public procuring entities in the evaluation of bids 
under the Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act. When evaluating bids, 
public procuring entities must give due regard to the preferential rating system which 
stipulates three levels of evaluation, being functionality – that is, technical evaluation, 
price – that is, financial evaluation and finally, specific preferential goals – that is the 
B-BBEE score, which is intended to deal with South Africa’s unique socio-economic 
conditions owing to its historical political background which was planted thick with 
apartheid policies.99 This level of evaluation therefore, gives preference to people or 
groups that have endured great historical disadvantage and unfair discrimination 
owing to disability, gender and / or race.      
For evaluation purposes, public procurement contracts are divided into two broad 
categories, that is, contracts below One Million Rand and those above One Million 
Rand. Concerning those contracts that fall within the former category, eighty (80) 
points are assigned to technical and financial evaluation while the remaining twenty 
(20) points are accounted for in the specific-goals evaluation. With regard to the latter 
category, ninety (90) points are assigned to technical and financial evaluation while 
the remaining ten (10) points cover the specific-goals evaluation.100  
The alignment of the Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act with the Broad-
Based Black Economic Empowerment Act has achieved the purpose of ensuring that 
a party who submits his bid and has attained a level 1 status in terms of the B-BBEEA 
                                                          
99 Phoebe Bolton, “The Public Procurement System in South Africa: Main Characteristics”, Public 
Contract Law Journal, Vol. 37, No. 4 (Summer 2017), Pp. 76 - 89.  
100 Bolton P., “Government procurement as a policy tool in South Africa”, Journal of Public Procurement, 
(2017), Pp. 94 - 119. 
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rating system, should be awarded the maximum number of points available (being, 
either 20 or 10, taking into consideration the value of the contract, as discussed above) 
for the specified goals evaluation category under the preference point system.101 
The tender is then awarded to the bidder with the highest evaluated score unless there 
are compelling reasons – considered on the basis of an objective criteria – that would 
warrant the tender being awarded to a different bidder.102      
3.3.1 B-BBEE Compliance and Certification 
The preferential rating system under the B-BBEEA is divided into different levels – 
eight in number. An entity’s B-BBEE status level is determined by way of calculation, 
by applying the mathematical formulation prescribed under the Act. The manner in 
which particular businesses take up and mainstream the B-BBEE agenda is left to the 
individual enterprises as the Act does not impose legal obligations (by way of 
sanctions, or however) on the compliance with the specified targets.103  
Notwithstanding the fact that compliance with the B-BBEE targets is not legally 
demanded, a compliance certification however, lends businesses credibility and will 
no doubt impact an entity’s level of participation in the market, very by inevitably 
affecting that entity’s ability to attract business with regard to tenders from the 
Government and other State agencies.104  
                                                          
101 Bolton P., “Government procurement as a policy tool in South Africa”, Journal of Public Procurement, 
(2017), Pp. 94 - 119.  
102 Bolton P., “Government procurement as a policy tool in South Africa”, Journal of Public Procurement, 
(2017), Pp. 94 - 119.  
103 Ratuva S., “Black empowerment policies: Dilemmas of Affirmative Action in South Africa”, ANU Press. 
(2017), Pp. 111 - 127. 
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A firm’s B-BBEE status is measured having regard to five BBBEE compliance factors, 
namely: ownership; management and control; socio-economic development; new 
enterprise and supplies development; and finally, management control. In practice, B-
BBEE appraisals are done annually by an accredited B-BBEE verification agent who 
then releases a BBBEE certificate indicating the entity’s B-BBEE rating.105 Each of these 
factors are weighted differently, as follows: 
Figure V: B-BBEE Certification Factors 
Item Factor Maximum available Number of 
weighting points 
1 Ownership 25 
2 Management Control 15 plus 4 bonus points 
3 Skills Development 20 plus 5 bonus points 
4 New Enterprise & Supplier 
Development 
40 plus 4 bonus points 
5 Socio-economic Development 5 
  
 
Figure VI: The B-BBEE Score Card  
BBBEE STATUS REQUIRED WEIGHTING POINTS  
LEVEL – 1 100 points or above 
LEVEL – 2 Between 95 and 100 points 
LEVEL – 3 Between 90 and 95 points 
LEVEL – 4 Between 80 and 90 points 
LEVEL – 5 Between 75 and 80 points 
LEVEL – 6 Between 70 and 75 points 
LEVEL -7 Between 55 and 70 points 
LEVEL – 8 Between 40 and 55 points 
NON-COMPLIANT  Below 40 points 
  
                                                          
105 Phoebe Bolton, “The Public Procurement System in South Africa: Main Characteristics”, Public Contract 
Law Journal, Vol. 37, No. 4 (Summer 2017) Pp. 94 - 119.  
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3.3.2 Other Considerations 
Besides the five compliance factors discussed above, certain other considerations – as 
pertains to the size and duration of existence – of the entity, also play a pivotal role 
when assessing a firm’s B-BBEE ranking. In this category, business entities can either 
be small or medium-sized; start-ups and large enterprises.106  
All Exempted Micro-Enterprises (EMEs) irrespective of the arrangement of their 
ownership structure and / or composition, are invariably regarded to have a Level 4 
B-BBEE status. What then is an EME establishment? These have been defined as 
enterprises that have an aggregate annual revenue of Ten (10) Million Rand or less. 
Furthermore, all start-up enterprises are treated as EMEs for purposes of the B-BBEE 
rating during their first year of registration or incorporation.107  
There is yet another category of entities referred to as the Qualifying Small Enterprise 
(QSEs). For an entity to be eligible under his head, it needs to have a total annual 
revenue of between Ten (10) Million and Fifty (50) Million Rand. These entities do not 
however receive any preferential treatment in the determination of their B-BBEE 
status; their B-BBEE score is measured strictly by reference to the five B-BBEE factors. 
Finally, business establishments with an annual total revenue of, or in the excess of, 
fifty (50) Million Rand are categorized as Large Enterprises.108  
                                                          
106 Bolton P., “Government procurement as a policy tool in South Africa”, Journal of Public Procurement, 
(2017) Pp. 94 - 119.  
107 Sweet M. J., “Minority Business Enterprise Programmes in the United States of America: An Empirical 
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108 Sweet M. J., “Minority Business Enterprise Programmes in the United States of America: An Empirical 
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The B-BBEE Regulations establish a further level of preference based on a firm’s 
ownership structure. EMEs and QSEs that are wholly (100%) owned by black people 
are – by that fact alone – considered to have an automatic Level 1 B-BBEE rating; while 
EMEs and QSEs that have a majority black ownership (above 51%) are considered to 
have an automatic Level 2 B-BBEE rating. No doubt, this accords black-owned EMEs 
and QSEs a significantly substantial advantage over other EMEs and QSEs.109  
This policy can however be justified on affirmative action grounds, the argument 
being that this form of preferential treatment seeks to eradicate or ameliorate the 
historical inequalities of the apartheid regime.110 
It is also interesting to note that EMEs and QSEs are not required to obtain a certificate 
from a B-BBEE verification agent to verify their B-BBEE category. They need only 
swear an affidavit that speaks to the firm’s total annual income and percentage of 
black ownership. This is a commendable cost saving mechanism for all EMEs and 
QSEs.111 
A unique feature of the B-BBEE system is that it uses incentives to encourage business 
enterprises to aspire to attain the highest level of B-BBEE compliance. Under this 
scheme, businesses are allowed to claim back a defined percentage of the money that 
they spend on procurement. These claims are pegged to and derive from a firm’s B-
BBEE rating.  
                                                          
109 Preferential Procurement Regulations, 2017, Regulation 4.  
110 Tangri R.; Southall R., “The Politics of Black Economic Empowerment in South Africa”, Journal of 
Southern African Studies, Vol. 34, No. 3 (Sep. 2018), Pp. 97 - 113.  
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The figure below gives a summary of the allowed percentages of the total procurement 
expenditure, that a firm can claim back, expressed as a function of the firm’s B-BBEE 
status.112  
Uncompliant  
Figure VII: Percentage of procurement expenditure that can be claimed back.  
BBBEE Status Number of Weighting Points 
Required 
Claim-back percentage 
Level – 1 100 points or above 135% 
Level – 2 Between 95 and 100 points 125% 
Level – 3 Between 90 and 95 points 110% 
Level – 4 Between 80 and 90 points 100% 
Level – 5 Between 75 and 80 points 80% 
Level – 6 Between 70 and 75 points 60% 
Level – 7 Between 55 and 70 points 50% 
Level – 8 Between 40 and 55 points 10% 
Noncompliant    Below 40 points NIL 
 
3.4 Discussion and Case-Study Analysis  
Kenya, the United States of America and South Africa, all have comprehensive and 
well-established affirmative policies and schemes, firmly entrenched in the respective 
counties’ procurement laws, aimed at providing assistance to small businesses 
established by persons considered to have been historically marginalised or 
disadvantaged. Although each country’s preference and reservation programs are 
unique to itself – bearing in mind unique historical differences and peculiar socio-
economic circumstances of each – yet the philosophy underlying these programs is 
                                                          
112 Nkosi M. “New Bee Legislation – Further Amendments to The Codes of Good Practice”, Journal of 
Southern African Studies, Vol. 34, No. 3 (June, 2018), Pp. 45 - 57.  
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similar: that of achieving inclusivity by promoting the participation - by all - in the 
economic activities of the country. 
There are, however, major notable differences in the mode of registration or 
certification adopted by the three legal regimes, for the recognition of eligible business 
enterprises in order for them to benefit from the reservation and preference schemes. 
As already discussed in chapter two of this thesis, the Kenyan regime operates a two-
tier, and sometimes three-tier registration system for all the three categories of 
preference, being, persons with disability, women and the youth. Firms in Kenya 
have, as of necessity, to go through the business registration service, obtain industry-
specific certification before they can then obtain registration under the AGPO 
program. For those firms owned by persons with disability, there is yet an additional 
requirement to obtain certification from the Council for Persons with disabilities. 
If an entity successfully goes through the rigors of this process, it obtains an AGPO 
registration. This registration is however valid for a period of five years after which 
those entities which still qualify for recognition under the preference program must 
submit a fresh application for registration.  
The Kenyan scenario is contrasted with the U.S regime which advocates for a self-
certification process, where entities which qualify under the preference scheme (as 
define in the U.S Small Business Act) merely submit a self-certification declaration 
which states, in good faith, that the firm is eligible under the scheme.  
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Recertification under the U.S regime is only applicable for entities which – owing to a 
merger or acquisition – gain an enhanced status and become, other than small. These 
entities must file a recertification indicating their changed status.  
Recertification under the U.S regime also affects entities that are performing long-term 
contracts. These are required to submit a re-certification before the sixth year of the 
contract, and thereafter, before any option is exercised by the contracting parties.   
On its part, the South African regime, may be said to adopt a two-pronged approach; 
while it is based on a formal registration system under the B-BBEE preference scheme, 
it allows for certain firms to be exempted from registration: EMEs and QSEs are not 
required to obtain a certificate from a B-BBEE verification agent to endorse their B-
BBEE status. They need only swear an affidavit that speaks to the firm’s total annual 
income and percentage of black ownership.  
Furthermore, and as has already been discussed earlier in this chapter, the South 
African system introduces yet another novel concept aimed at encouraging businesses 
to strive to attain the highest B-BBEE compliance - that of using incentives. Businesses 
are allowed to claim back a defined percentage of the money that they spend on 
procurement. This claim is pegged to the firm’s B-BBEE rating.  
3.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has considered the preferential procurement systems of the United States 
of America and that of South Africa. It has contrasted the eligibility criteria and the 
registration requirements under the preference programs in the selected jurisdictions 
with the those obtaining in Kenya’s AGPO program.  
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Finally, the chapter gives a discussion and provides a summary of the lessons learnt 




4 CHAPTER FOUR: NAVIGATING THE AGPO 




Having considered the legal and regulatory framework governing preference and 
reservation schemes in the two selected foreign jurisdictions, this chapter engages in 
a discussion of the various complexities - other than the ones identified and discussed 
in the preceding chapter - in the AGPO eligibility and registration processes that have 
emerged in the course of conducting this research, in a bid to explore possible 
solutions to the identified difficulties.     
4.2 Abuse of the Corporate Form 
As has already been discussed in chapter two of this study, the Public Procurement 
and Disposal (Preference and Reservations) Regulations, prescribe a formal 
qualification criterion for entities that wish to be registered under preference and 
reservation schemes. As pertains to enterprises owned by persons with disability, 
women and the youth, the regulations require that such entities shall be legal entities 
(that is to say, companies, partnerships or sole proprietorships) which have been 
registered with the various government bodies responsible for such purposes and that 
have at least 70% membership of persons with disability, women or the youth. The 
leadership of the said entities shall be 100% persons with disability, women or the 
youth, respectively.113   
                                                          




There have however been instances where certain unscrupulous traders have been 
known to manipulate the registration structure by procuring counterfeit documents 
and using these forged documents to fraudulently register companies in the names of 
women, the youth and persons living with disability so as to unfairly gain access to 
the reserved opportunities.114 This practice diverts resources and undermines 
affirmative action efforts. It deprives genuine and deserving members of the minority 
groups of the chance to benefit from the procurement opportunities available under 
the preference and reservation scheme.  
The unscrupulous traders would normally be persons who are restricted from AGPO 
registration by reason of ineligibility, usually because they are neither women, youth 
or persons with disability. By incorporating a sham company, which from the outside 
look meets all AGPO eligibility requirements, but whose actual ownership and control 
lies in the hands of ineligible persons, the concerned persons do so with deceptive 
intent to undermine or defeat the objectives of the AGPO program.  
4.2.1 Piercing of the Corporate Veil 
This study therefore argues that in order to circumvent, forestall and / or dismantle 
this fraudulent practice, the administrators of the AGPO program should, upon 
reasonably suspecting the existence of such fraudulent scheme, be empowered – 
through appropriate judicial process – to pierce the corporate veil of the concerned 
entity. Lifting and or piercing the veil of incorporation as is popularly known, is a 
company law concept that means looking through the corporate form, to a company’s 
                                                          
114 Kiarahu M., “Participation of minorities and marginalised groups in the Kenyan economy: reforming 
public procurement law” International Journal of Advanced Research, June 2013, Pp. 67 - 74. 
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shareholders.115 Although this principle is accepted under law, the law however 
recognises that lifting of the corporate veil can only be resorted to in exceptional and 
limited circumstances. This concept is a fall-back principle, as it were, that has been 
developed pragmatically to offer practical solutions to very particular sets of 
circumstances.  
The misuse of the company structure so as to orchestrate or perpetuate fraud by 
undermining the very objective of the AGPO program, this research argues, can find 
ready accommodation in the exceptions of the application of the principle of piercing 
the corporate veil. This is a justifiable basis that should trigger the administrators of 
the AGPO program to move to obtain leave to look deeper, beyond the corporate form, 
to the actual shareholders and directors of the company under consideration.  
Kenya’s Companies Act recognises the concept of piercing the corporate veil. The Act 
empowers the Attorney-General, upon satisfying himself that there are reasonable 
grounds to warrant the launching of an investigation into the membership of any 
company, to appoint such number of inspectors as is necessary to undertake the 
required investigation. Upon the conclusion of the investigation, the inspector (s) shall 
report back to the Attorney-General. The report shall contain particulars of the 
members of the company in question and provide details of persons who would 
appear to be financially keen either on the failure of success of such company, as well 
as the people who influence and / or materially hold sway over the company’s 
policies.116 
                                                          
115 Ferran E.; Ho  L. C. “Principles of Corporate Finance Law” Oxford University Press, 2014.  
116 The Companies Act, No 17 of 2015, Section 800.  
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For the purpose of that investigative exercise, the Act also confers on the inspector (s), 
power to investigate the membership of any other company that may be connected to 
the company under investigation for the same purpose.117 
This thesis therefore calls for the establishment of joint, collaborative and concerted 
efforts between the Office of the Attorney-General and the National Treasury, which 
is the mother ministry of the AGPO program, so as to circumvent the illegal and 
fraudulent dealings of those bad actors who seek to undermine the objectives of the 
AGPO program through the establishment of sham companies which they use as a 
front to fraudulently secure or gain access to the preferential procurement 
opportunities reserved for genuine members of the special interest groups.    
4.2.2 Beneficial Ownership Requirements 
Recently in Kenya, by way of amendment,118 the Companies Act of 2015 was revised 
to introduce new provisions pertaining to beneficial ownership of companies. The 
Companies Act has now incorporated a new definition for the concept of beneficial 
ownership.”119   
A new section 93A which was introduced through the Statute Law (Miscellaneous 
Amendments) Act, obligates all companies to keep a register of beneficial owners with 
the relevant information relating to the said beneficial owners as will be prescribed by 
the Companies (Beneficial Ownership Information) Regulations.  
                                                          
117 The Companies Act, No 17 of 2015, Section 801. 
118 The Companies (Amendment) Act, 2017; a further amendment to the Companies Act was carried in 
the Statute Law (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act, No. 12 of 2019.  
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The move to make it obligatory for all companies to register the relevant information 
concerning their beneficial owners can be interpreted as intended to promote and 
increase transparency standards in the ownership of companies. 
The said amendments also stipulate timelines within which companies are to comply 
with the new provisions as well as introducing offences for non-compliance.  
However, the new amendments contemplate the publication of regulations that will 
help concretize the application and operation of the provisions that relate to beneficial 
ownership of companies. Regrettably, however, as at the date of conducting this 
research, the said regulations were yet to be finalized and published. It is expected 
however, that the regulations will stipulate what relevant information concerning the 
beneficial owners of companies should be contained in the register as well as defining 
conditions that natural persons must meet in order to be disclosed as persons wielding 
significant control over the company.  
In addition, it is expected, indeed hoped, that the regulations should also lay down 
and stipulate the procedure to be followed in order to access particulars and 
information concerning the beneficial owners of a company. This is particularly 
important especially considering that the relevant information might include personal 





This research therefore suggests that whatever process will be defined by the 
regulations as constituting the proper procedure to gain access to the said relevant 
information, should be such as is readily accessible to the administrators of the AGPO 
program, either directly or indirectly - through collaboration and / or the requirement 
to share information with other regulatory agencies. Having ready access to 
information concerning the beneficial owners of companies will enable administrators 
of the AGPO program to detect sham companies used by fraudulent actors to 
undermine the objectives of the program. Administrative and judicial action can then 
be taken against such entities and their beneficial owners.    
4.3 Adequacy of the Institutional Regulatory Framework 
The mandate of the PPRA has already been discussed under chapter two (Kenya’s 
Public Procurement (Preference and Reservation) Legal and Regulatory Framework) 
of this thesis. What is interesting to note however, is that despite the very expansive 
roles assigned to it, the PPRA lacks the requisite commensurate power of enforcement. 
As a matter of fact, the PPADA envisages a situation where the PPRA engages in no 
enforcement duties. The PPADA rather requires the PPRA, upon forming an opinion 
that proceedings – be they civil or criminal – should be commenced against a public 
entity, state organ, state officer or public officer - to defer all such enforcement to the 
relevant authorities.120 
This thesis therefore proposes that the PPADA be amended with a view to clothing 
the PPRA with the necessary investigative and enforcement powers. An entrenched 
                                                          
120 Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Act, No. 33 of 2015, Section 9 (2). 
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enforcement mechanism within the PPRA’s structure will boost the Authority’s 
execution faculties, leading to improved compliance with the AGPO’s standards and 
in the long term, lead to the overall attainment of the AGPO objective.  
Another emerging point of concern is that regrettably, the PPRA does not maintain 
the required database, especially as concerns public entities that fail to adhere to the 
requirement that all public entities reserve 30% of their procurement opportunities to 
members of special interest groups, being women, persons with disability and the 
youth. In the same vein, important procurement statistics maintained by the PPRA are 
not up to date, the last published annual report being for the year 2016. This situation 
has been blamed on the lack of adequate financial and human resource capacity to 
discharge these monitoring and reporting functions adequately.  
The PPRA depends, for its financing, majorly on distributions from the exchequer. 
The quantum of the disbursements is stated to be based on determinations made by 
the PPRA’s board regarding the Authority’s capital and recurrent expenditure, as well 
as any reserves that the Authority may be in need of from time to time.121 In the recent 
past however, the Government has increasingly adopted austerity measures in its 
financial distributions to state agencies, including the PPRA. This scaling down of 
financial resources, no doubt, negatively impacts service delivery by affecting the 
degree of efficiency with which the entities concerned deploy and discharge their 
assigned mandate.  
                                                          
121 Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Act, No. 33 of 2015, Section 12 (1) (e). 
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This study therefore advocates for an increase in the PPRA’s annual budgetary 
allocation. This will fortify the Authority’s financial base which will in turn translate 
into an empowered human resource pool as well as the deployment of effective 
systems that all work together in order to ensure that delivery of services is achieved 
in an efficient manner and that there is improved compliance with the AGPO’s 
monitoring and reporting standards.   
4.4 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has discussed the various complexities in the AGPO eligibility and 
registration processes that have emerged in the course of conducting this research, in 
a bid to explore possible solutions to the identified difficulties. The chapter identified 
two key challenges, being abuse of the corporate form and inadequacy of the 
institutional regulatory framework. The chapter suggests various solutions to the 
identified challenges, including, lifting of the corporate veil and the publication of 




5 CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS   
5.1 Introduction  
A system that achieves the proper (effective and efficient) identification of entities that 
should form the object of preference under any legal regime’s procurement 
(preference and reservation) program is very critical to the success of such program. 
This research has had the benefit of looking into two chosen procurement legal 
regimes, being, the United States of America and South Africa, the basis upon which, 
the current chapter now seeks to outline – by way of recommendations - the important 
lessons that the Kenya procurement (preference ad reservation) legal regime can learn 
from the selected jurisdictions, in order to improve (in  terms of achieving enhanced 
efficiency and effectiveness) the eligibility criteria and registration processes under 
the AGPO program. 
Some recommendations contained in this chapter also arise out of the findings that 
the study has discovered through the analysis of Kenya’s procurement legal regime 
and practice.         
5.2 Conclusion 
This thesis set out to examine the eligibility and registration requirements under 
Kenya’s AGPO program; it interrogated the registration process’s appropriateness 
and the impact (if any) that the current AGPO registration system has on the 
achievement of the overall objectives of the AGPO program. The research has 
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succeeded in showing that there indeed exists an intricate connection between the 
AGPO registration requirements for special interest groups and the success of the 
AGPO program.  
The study has also demonstrated, in detail, how the AGPO registration requirements 
have contributed to the non-compliance by Government and public institutions to the 
30% statutory reservation quota in the AGPO initiative. Finally, borrowing of the 
United States’ and the South African legal systems, the research has put forward 
certain recommendations, most of which can be achieved through legislative 
amendments, that will see the introduction of reforms to the AGPO eligibility criteria 
and registration requirements in a bid to first, achieve the AGPO’s objective, and then 
to ensure continued sustainability of the AGPO compliance levels.      
5.3 Recommendations 
This study proposes that Kenya’s procurement (preference and reservation) program 
should be restructured to adopt a self-certification system, after the United States 
model or to adopt a South African-like system that exempts small businesses from the 
formal registration requirements. Entities that are seeking preferential treatment 
under the AGPO program should rather be encouraged / expected to swear an 
affidavit that speaks to their eligibility under the program, according to the 
predetermined eligibility criteria defined under the Public Procurement and Asset 
Disposal Act. As noted in chapter two of this study, the special interest entities face 
great financial constraints that have proved to be major impediments to their 
registration under the AGPO program. Self-certification will act as a cost saving 
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mechanism that helps lift this heavy financial burden from the shoulders of the special 
interest entities.    
This research further recommends that the Public Procurement and Asset Disposal 
Act (PPADA) be amended to introduce new offences – both for individual persons 
and for companies that engage in the unscrupulous and fraudulent conduct that 
frustrates and / or undermines the very objective of the AGPO preference system.  
These offences, the study suggests, should be so couched as to bring within their 
ambit, all conceivable illegal practices while at the same time, leaving enough room 
for enforcement agencies to infer other innovative criminal practices (that may lie 
within the penumbra zone of the express offences) as and when they arise. The 
latitude of the defined offences should be so wide as to include the very obvious 
wrongs, like the outright fraudulent misrepresentation of a firm’s AGPO status as well 
as to cover the more subtle forms of manipulation that involve using certain members 
of the special interest groups merely as a front, disguise or  façade to gain the AGPO 
certification, whereas, in actual sense, the firm in question is owned and run by people 
who are not eligible to be accorded preference under the program; for greater 
effectiveness, it is suggested that the offences should be accompanied by hefty 
penalties – both civil and criminal in nature – to serve as a deterrent measure against 
such fraudulent conduct exhibited by bad actors.   
In line with the above, this thesis also proposes that the Public Procurement 
Regulatory Authority (PPRA) be empowered, through the amendment of the PPADA 




These measures will prove useful in PPRA’s efforts aimed at expanding its financial 
base and building its human resource capacity. This will boost the Authority’s 
enforcement faculties, leading to improved compliance with the AGPO’s standards 
and in the long term, lead to the overall attainment of the overall AGPO objective.  
Further, in order to attain the aim of achieving the 30% reservation quota for the 
special interest groups, the study proposes that the eligibility criteria for the target 
groups be expanded to cover the economic position of the firms seeking a preferential 
advantage from the AGPO reservation system. The registration process should 
therefore be reviewed with a view to requiring the entities seeking registration under 
the program to provide proof of economic disadvantage or marginalization. 
This research has indicated that both the United States’ and the South African 
preferential systems are inextricably linked to firms’ total annual revenue. This is 
unlike the Kenyan situation whose preference system makes no reference to a firm’s 
economic situation. Often times, economically sound persons with disability, women 
and youth have exploited this loophole to expand their business empires at the 
expense of the economically marginalized groups whose social and economic welfare 
the AGPO program was intended to improve and uplift. These economically well-to-
do firms, for instance, do not experience the financial difficulties that are associated 
with the current AGPO registration requirements; they meet the registration 
requirements quite easily and effortlessly and this gives a false / distorted impression 
to the administrators of the AGPO program that the requirements are attainable, when 
in actual fact, the requirements are unduly burdensome to the intended genuine 
beneficiaries of the preference program.  
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The requirement to provide proof of economic status, the research suggests, will help 
seal the identified loophole thereby improving the efficiency of the AGPO initiative.  
This study further suggests that to help mitigate the financial constraints experienced 
by the special interest groups, the PPADA should be amended to compel the 
Government and other public procuring entities to promptly settle bills for goods and 
services already supplied pursuant to procurement contracts that were awarded to 
members of special interest groups under the AGPO program. As already pointed out, 
the AGPO registration requirements are financially prohibitive and any statutory 
amendments and legal interventions that could have the effect of improving the cash-
flow situation of the special interest groups, should be embraced.     
This study also proposes the imposition of sanctions upon those public entities that 
fail to submit their quarterly AGPO compliance reports to the Public Procurement 
Regulatory Authority (PPRA). This can be achieved through legislative reform, by the 
amendment of the PPADA. The PPRA is expected to rely on the data and information 
contained in these reports to make important administrative judgments. The success 
or failure of the AGPO program can only be assessed upon analysing the said 
compliance reports but if no reports are availed to the PPRA, the functions of the 
Authority - including the Authority’s ability to monitor the AGPO registration process 
– are significantly curtailed. The danger that lurks herein is that if compliance reports 
are not submitted in time, or at all, non-functioning processes will not be flagged out 
in time, or at all; this in turn means that remedial measures will not implemented and 
this will eventually and inevitably lead to the overall failure and collapse of the entire 
AGPO system.               
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Lastly, this thesis recommends the abolition of categorizations under which the 
special interest entities can submit tenders for public procurement opportunities. The 
current categorizations have created unnecessary impediments that have prevented 
the AGPO registered entities from taking full advantage of tendering opportunities 
which do not fall under their registered category but which they, nonetheless, have 
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